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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ ultimately failing, to produce more locally attuned place-based economic development interventions. It should also not be lost on analysts that for Heseltine to argue for a new local dynamic to shape policy intervention is to simply restate the classic devolution demand for more say, more resource, and more autonomy over how localities and regions are governed.
If a step is taken back from this, what can be seen is an attempt to work from within a long-established set of parameters, where decentralisation and devolution are orchestrated by the state, with the state's own interests to the fore. Heseltine's use of the word 'we' in the context of enabling local areas to produce more place-based economic development interventions is particularly significant and should not be overlooked, lest Rodríguez-Pose and Gill's (2003: 334) axiom on devolution be forgotten: "The complexity of the devolution process derives from the interest conflicts of the actors involved and the differences in legitimacy that they share. … Although national governments would prefer, ceteris paribus, to devolve responsibilities (authority) to their regional or state governments with as few accompanying 5 | P a g e resources as possible, the subnational governments would prefer the opposite case.
The balance between these extremes will depend upon the relative strength, or, in political terms, legitimacy, of the two tiers of government.
The point here is that if the scope for place-based economic development strategies is to be appraised, this devolution conundrum must be recognised in any analysis. Post-Fordist, post-Keynesian, post-national capitalist territorial development can be characterised by periods of systematic governmentalised remappings of state space, with attempts to implement place-based economic development strategies constrained by the parameters of a 'centrally-orchestrated' approach to local and regional economic development; that is, the centre wants something different from the local (cf. Peck, 1995; Harrison, 2008) . LEPs are but the latest in this saga.
To explore these issues, the article first offers a critical appraisal of current approaches to place-based economic development strategies. Focusing on the current capabilities of LEPs and the role of private sector engagement in developing and implementing place-based economic development strategies, the second section then makes the case for considering alternatives to the prevailing orthodoxy of neoliberal state spatial restructuring and governmentalised remappings of state space. By this it is meant that there is the need to consider state-centrism and the constraints of the UK's highly centralised system in order to contemplate genuinely alternative place-based economic development strategies. Illustrated through the case study of Peel's Atlantic Gateway Strategy in North West England, in the third section, the article examines of the rise of what may be conceived of as an example of a new non-state place-based economic development strategy. It examines the motivations, tactics and strategies behind Peel's involvement in place-based economic development, as well as the mechanisms through which the orientation and implementation of economic development is being remodelled.
The article concludes that on the evidence of what Peel's Atlantic Gateway Strategy signifies, with the private sector taking the lead, this non state place-based strategy might be a valid alternative to state created place-based strategies. It may be that it is private investment, supported by the public sector, which will characterise the next decade of economic development. This increases the potential for more non-state (or certainly private-sector led) spatial strategies to emerge, raising important questions about the shifting relationship between public and private sector. The example of the Atlantic Gateway Strategy shows that while Peel has the money and power to have an increasingly significant say in place-based economic development, it is not a democratic institution and therefore cannot decide what type of place-based economic development is legitimated.
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO PLACE-BASED ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Although established as the flagship institution for the Cameron-led Government's 'localist' framework in England, LEPs have been constrained from the beginning. A product of the UK state's latest remapping of state space LEPs lack legitimacy, resource, and are not the result of any significant autonomous local action. Lord Heseltine's call for LEPs to be empowered is thus not surprising; this has been seen before in the case of the Regional Development Agencies and Training and Enterprise Councils (Jones, 2013) . These institutions had no more power and were no more democratically accountable to localist interests than are the LEPs. The problem is that the parameters which see these institutions created as weak are the same ones which solutions put forward to strengthen them are forced to work within. Lord Heseltine's call for LEPs to be empowered with more resource, more power, and more say is a classic example of this. It presupposes LEPs are the answer.
But what if LEPs are not the answer, as many critics argue; surely it is necessary to consider the alternatives? Even where LEPs are perceived to be the answer, as advocates would have it, it is necessary to be clear what question they are the answer to.
What this suggests is that the rules of the game continue to be formulated by the central state, with everyone working to those rules. This is no more evident than in Lord Heseltine's opinion that the solution for creating more place-based approach economic development interventions should come from within the state system itself -tasking existing officials from the top-down with new roles and remits (House of Commons BIS Select Committee, 2013). Operating in this way it is tempting to conclude that the power of this state-led approach is precisely that by closing down one alternative to state-led solutions and instituting another, it enables the state to protect its legitimacy in maintaining regulatory control and management of the economy. It is the classic devolution conundrum.
This raises the question of whether it is possible to look beyond the confines of a tightlyconstructed state-centred discourse to consider whether genuine alternative(s to) placebased economic development strategies exist.
Whilst there remains undoubted interest and capacity to further develop statecentred analyses, the key point of this article is consideration of the near-future potential for alternative(s to) place-based economic development strategies designed, orchestrated, and implemented by non-state actors. This approach is underscored by three primary considerations. First, institutions of the state are increasingly dependent on non-state actors to deliver the jobs, growth, and regeneration of the future. In part this is due to the crisis of economic development which has seen relative disinvestment in public infrastructure and state subsidy (compared with the period of spatial Keynesianism and exacerbated by present day fiscal austerity). Allied to this, there are increasing demands on the state to make greater strategic investments to (1) reduce the public infrastructure deficit in an era when conforming to the discourse of global competitiveness by investing in economic, social and physical infrastructure is deemed essential to creating the localised conditions necessary to tap into trans-national circuits of globalised capital accumulation, and (2) stimulate the economy by bringing forward major infrastructure projects in this era of austerity.
A second point is that there can be little doubt that place (still) matters in this regard.
With a predominance of fixed infrastructural investments (e.g. transport networks, energy grids) and public service assets (e.g. schools, hospitals, fire stations) globalising cities have become key regulatory and investment spaces which private industry have set about controlling, managing and extracting value from. Seen from this perspective it might be expected that non-state actors would be taking a more active role in the economic development and regeneration process in these globalising cities; the article contends they are. A third point is that a literature is emerging which identifies the privatisation of urban and regional development and rise of new non-state spatial strategies as emerging trends in local and regional economic development (Knieling et al., 2012; Harrison, 2013) . This suggests that is it possible to consider the near-future potential for alternative place-based economic development strategies designed, orchestrated, and implemented by non-state actors; in effect, the takeover of the development of economic strategy and implementation by the private sector. In fact, it may be that non-state actors are better able to deliver placebased economic development strategies? The article turns to explore the issues further in looking at the rise of non-state spatial strategies.
BEYOND STATE-CENTRISM: EXAMINING THE RISE OF NON-STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES
Amid the globalisation of economic and political life much has been made of the trial-anderror search for a new spatial/scalar fix to underpin the post-Fordist growth dynamic. The nature of state spatial strategies and the changes in institutional subnational structures of economic governance have come to reflect the fashionable discourses occupying academics, politicians, and policymakers. The UK (and especially England) is no exception to this; since 1997, the discursive frame has shifted from regions (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , through cities and regions (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , to arrive at localism (2010-present) . This political praxis has seen the decentralisation of tasks and responsibilities to various subnational institutional frameworks which critics argue has been little more than a 'firework display' (Harrison, 2012) . This sees a new initiative launched with a crescendo of noise, sparkle for a short time, only to fizzle out and disappear from sight. The result is a subnational economic development landscape scarred by the 'corpses' of earlier institutions (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013 ) -a fate likely to be suffered by the LEPs, the latest fashionable institution, and any future decentralised institution that is constructed to this specification (Gash et al., 2014) .
Capabilities of LEPs
Many commentators -both academic and non-academic -see LEPs as an "empty policy" (Jackson et al., 2013, p. 27) which is "destined for oblivion" (Walker, 2012) . But while it would be wrong to say that all commentators feel as strongly, given England's affection for perpetual restructuring the question appears not if, but when, LEPs will be abolished (Ward and Hardy, 2013) . The problem, as alluded to above, is the rules of the game and the contradictions inherent in state-led place-based economic development. Despite being charged with spearheading the Coalition Government's localist approach to economic development, these contradictions include: many of the powers (particularly around business support) being re-centralised in the transition from RDAs to LEPs, ensuring LEPs are less governmentalised than their predecessors; a localist framework where the central state actually determines their priorities and practices (both in the parameters they set when requiring approval of key decisions by Ministers and the conditions/incentives accompanying government funding); LEPs had a brief to operate across functional economic areas yet they have been defined by territorial politics; and where central government's piecemeal approach to furnishing LEPs with resource and power ensured the majority spent their fledgling years fighting for more resources, rather than delivering on economic development objectives.
The LEPs have also been roundly criticised -both as institution and policy initiativefor not enabling significant business and community/society involvement in the process.
Local accountability or the lack thereof is significant to the Peel case study, particularly given the focus on community-led local development from the European Commission for the 2014-2020 programming period, but business involvement is the main focus here because it is business needs which are driving considerations for conceptualising the 'non-state' placebased strategy.
Private sector engagement
Evaluating the LEP bids, SQW (2010: 6) argues that business involvement was "in general, thin" and "unsurprising given the difficulty of marshalling the business community to engage in a process that -from their perspective -could have seemed abstract and of no immediate consequence". Little improvement appears to have been made over the past two-years. Recent analysis by the Work Foundation suggests the 'clock is ticking' on business involvement, with many business leaders "ready to walk" away if their LEP does not start producing tangible gains in the very near future (Cominetti et al., 2012: 1) . This is a view reinforced by Syrett and Bertotti who, when reconsidering private sector engagement in subnational economic governance, conclude that a limited understanding of private sector engagement means LEPs "provide a fundamentally flawed governance model for addressing the practical realities of pursuing subnational economic development across differentially constituted economic and political urban and regional contexts" (2012: 2312). All three articles point out how the problem is rooted in the terms which the state sets out for private sector engagement in subnational economic development. In short, there is a clear disconnect between the scripted role for business involvement and their actual performance in subnational economic development (Wood, 2004 ).
This poses searching questions about the prospect for existing place-based economic development strategies to realise socioeconomic goals. But it also prompts consideration of the importance of (re)interpreting business-state relations in the context of subnational economic governance. For identifying the weakness of business involvement is only the first part of the equation. The more substantive part is to identify ways of aligning the interests of business and society within state-led models, or if this is not possible, to seek an alternative model. Syrett and Bertotti (2012: 2313) provide the context for this:
"Whilst state-centred analyses provide insights into the changing terrain which provides enhanced possibilities for private sector engagement, they have proved largely unable to explore why businesses actually choose to engage (or not) in urban governance, the mechanisms by which actors are engaged, and how the nature of engagement is played out to impact upon the evolution of practice."
With this as a starting point, the authors proceed with an in-depth longitudinal analysis of the implementation of the City Growth Strategy, one of the previous Labour Government's policy initiatives most committed to placing the private sector at the centre of designing and implementing public policy interventions in urban and regional development. A most revealing observation is that:
"despite initial business interest generated by high-profile launch events, it quickly became apparent to the majority of businesses that the City Growth Strategy provided little in the way of immediate business opportunities." (Syrett and Bertotti, 2012: 2318) This has all the hallmarks of the 'firework' metaphor. Yet it points also towards what is fast becoming a critical body of literature examining the tactics, motives and strategies for business (dis)engagement in subnational economic governance.
At the root of investigations into business-state relations in subnational economic development practices are a series of key questions: What is the motivation for business to get involved in subnational economic governance? How does business involvement unfold in different spatial and temporal contexts? What are the consequences and impacts of business involvement on economic development? What tactics and strategies do business leaders use as part of this process?
1 Emerging from this critical body of work is a strong sense of divergence in the public and private discourses, approaches, interests, perceptions, strategies and preferences that businesses invoke for their involvement and role in subnational policy. One of the most revealing insights is the move away from earlier explanations, where it was routinely assumed that political engagement was exclusively determined by a strong market rationale that saw businesses only interested in preserving and pursuing material self-interest (see Cox and Mair, 1989) , to an appreciation of the wider corporate social and ethical responsibilities, objectives, and motivations of business (Wood, 2004; Syrett and Bertotti, 2012 ).
This change is certainly evident in analysis of business engagement in LEPs, where material self-interest is seen by almost all business leaders as a 'secondary motivation' given very few report receiving any direct benefit to their business as a result of their involvement with LEPs (Cominetti et al., 2012) . A desire to support the local area, alongside networking opportunities, access to information, and prestige, are all seen as more significant motivating factors. Similarly, Syrett and Bertotti (2012) "A model of stripped-down local government with private sector contractors as 'strategic partners' potentially provides business a lead role in local economic development largely unfettered by some of the traditional requirements of democratic accountability, transparency, and scrutiny." (Syrett and Bertotti, 2012: 2323) What is striking about this outcome is the proposed solution remains state-centred. It is about reworking the balance of the current system, a compromise that aims to move the balance slightly more in favour of business vis-a-vis the local state in enacting a lead role in place-based economic development. This is one of many examples, it can be argued, that demonstrate the difficulty in looking beyond the confines of a tightly-constructed statecentred discourse to consider whether genuine alternative(s to) place-based economic development strategies exist. Providing further illustration of the power bound-up within state-led approaches, it is also perhaps why the authors are only prepared to commit to the 'potential' of their proposed solution in assigning business a lead role in place-based economic development? As with many aspirational communiques relating to place-based economic development it appears to be a statement made in hope rather than expectation. "the engagement of private sector actors in the design of public spaces is nothing new, however, they seem to be making strategic decisions not only related to their own business segment. Rather, they have a much larger area of influence relative to the object (topic-crossing) and the spatial cut (city regional) in view." (Knieling et al., 2012: 452 trans.) Yet for all Knieling et al. reveal 
PEEL'S ATLANTIC GATEWAY STRATEGY: A NEW FORM OF 'PLACE-BASED' ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT?
Launched on 5 September 2008, the Ocean Gateway -later renamed Atlantic Gateway -is a private sector vision and strategy for establishing England's North West region as an internationally significant investment opportunity and to capitalise on its economic potential to be a globally competitive major urban region 3 . Led by the 'Peel Group' (hereafter Peel) the Atlantic Gateway is a region, a concept, an investment strategy, an ambition, and a strategic plan:
• The Atlantic Gateway region is a 50-kilometre urban corridor connecting the Port of Liverpool in the heart of the Liverpool city-region to the centre of the Greater Manchester city-region along the historic Manchester Ship Canal.
• The Atlantic Gateway concept is a private sector vision for how strategic infrastructural investment can unlock the economic development potential of the area and enable it to become a major driver of national and international economic development and growth.
• The Atlantic Gateway investment strategy centres on Peel's proposed £50 billion investment programme in 50 of its most significant projects up to 2050, allied to local public sector support, presenting a compelling co-investment opportunity to UK Government.
• The Atlantic Gateway has the ambition to rebalance the UK in a way that regional policy has failed, ensuring the area is a net contributor to national wealth rather than a net recipient of redistributive state aid.
• The Atlantic Gateway is fast becoming a strategic plan, with its own Partnership Board overseeing its progress and delivery.
Peel's modus operandi is to put forward its ideas for how to drive transformational change and opportunity in the Atlantic Gateway region. In the first 5-years it has evolved and developed the support of others such that it now constitutes a broad, increasingly formalised, public and private sector growth coalition uniting to countenance the Atlantic been a credible proposition of that nature in Britain to achieve something decades of regional policy failed to achieve'." (Heseltine and Leahy, 2011: 56-57) This all points towards the Atlantic Gateway offering a potentially novel approach to placebased economic development, and is one which could stimulate new thinking and provide an alternative framework for realising the socio-economic goals of local and regional development. But it also prompts the need to consider other issues, such as the orientation, merits and dilemmas posed by such an alternative framework. Perhaps most important, the question is: Is it simply replacing one centralised system (state-centralism) with another (Peel-centrism) ? To answer this and other related questions it is necessary to examine the tactics and strategies employed by Peel in devising, developing, and delivering Atlantic
Gateway.
Tactics and strategies
When considering the emergence of new, alternative, or novel place-based economic development strategies it is important to ask by whom, for whom, they are being constructed, and why now? In the case of Ocean Gateway these questions are fairly straightforward to answer. John Whitaker, Chairman of Peel, made no secret at the launch event of Ocean Gateway that he saw it as a mechanism to both enable, and accelerate, Peel's delivery of major infrastructure, development and regeneration schemes:
"Ocean Gateway should have its own planning regime led by the regional development agency and the local authorities so we can overcome individual local authority objections." (quoted in Barry, 2008: n.p September 2010 (the day after the Government deadline for outline LEP proposals to be submitted) to discuss Peel's proposal. Without direct support from local authorities, Peel withdrew its LEP bid, following representation at the meeting by regional stakeholdersincluding the local authorities. Instead, it was agreed that an inclusive, partnership-based Atlantic Gateway Board -including one local authority representative from each LEPwould be established to secure strategic alignment with the 3 LEPs, to deliver the strongest level of partnership buy-in, and to develop and deliver Atlantic Gateway. A much less powerful resolution than Peel were initially pursuing, that they were still able to advance the Atlantic Gateway in the right strategic direction post-RDAs is testament to the inherent political power their land holdings and ownership of assets affords them in the North West.
If the transition from RDAs to LEPs saw Atlantic Gateway lose some of its impetus regionally, the change in national government presented a series of counter opportunities to advance apace the development of Atlantic Gateway. First, the formation of Conservative-led coalition government allied to programmes of fiscal austerity had led to wide-ranging cuts in the public sector and greater emphasis placed on business leading on the delivery of jobs, growth and regeneration, as well as on the provision of services previously delivered by the state. Second, the model of economic growth pursued by the Cameron-led government aspires to reduce the deficit and rebalance the economy (both geographically and by sector). Third, reform of the public bodies landscape -such as the removal of RDAs -is designed, in part, to enable a better dialogue between business and government and to facilitate greater business-engagement in informing public policy and shaping policy interventions (Cabinet Office, 2010) . And fourth, responding to pressure from business groups and international organisations, notably the IMF, to bring infrastructure investments forward to offset planned austerity and to act as an immediate stimulus for economic growth, the UK Government has increased investment in infrastructure and more broadly infrastructure-led economic regeneration.
It can be argued that Atlantic Gateway is a proposition likely, therefore, to gain more favour in the corridors of Westminster and Whitehall. Indeed, and this is critical, because Atlantic Gateway's success relies on co-investment, particularly from HM Government, because for all Peel's landholdings, assets and sector involvement, the connecting infrastructure (e.g. road, rail links) that is so central to unlocking the growth potential in the Atlantic Gateway area remain beyond the direct control of Peel or the other public-private partners. It can be seen that the current tactic and strategy being employed is to gain public sector investment in infrastructure to complement the Atlantic Gateway development, and it is one that is arguably producing some dividends 4 .
CONCLUSION: IS THERE A ROLE FOR NON-STATE 'PLACE-BASED' ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY?
According to Fabrizio Barca, author of the highly influential report for the European Commission on the reform of EU cohesion policy, "the 'place-based' approach is the 'new paradigm' of regional policy" (Barca, 2009: xi; see also OECD, 2009 ). Yet as this article has sought to reveal, it may be a very different type of place-based approach that determines local and regional development in the future. It can be argued that although the Atlantic Gateway might be somewhat unique (owing to the spatial proximity of Peel's landholdings and assets), the processes underpinning it are arguably not unique to Peel and North West England. This is being recognised by those internal to the Atlantic Gateway, such as Steven Broomhead (former NWDA Chief Executive and current advisor to the Atlantic Gateway Partnership Board):
"We all know the public purse is going to be constrained -it will be private investment which will characterise the next decade." (NWDA, 2010b: 1) It is also recognised by those external to the Atlantic Gateway:
"Fundamentally, the era of predominantly public finance investment in infrastructure is over and thus regeneration programmes will have to adapt to this new environment." (Howell, 2012: 5) The argument being put forward in this article is that the rise of the non-state spatial strategy may well become the norm and a potentially soon to be dominant feature of placebased economic development. Here in this article, the Atlantic Gateway, an entirely privatesector led strategic development initiative, is presented as a looking glass onto this potentially new, alternative and novel approach to the design, development and delivery of place-based economic development strategies. In addition to this, two points are worthy of particular emphasis.
First, by focusing on the business involved as opposed to business involvement per se, it has been demonstrated that while Peel's motivation for engaging in the design and development of a place-based economic development strategy has remained largely unchanged over time, the tactics and strategies required to defend, enable certain essential interests to be realised have had to evolve. Alongside this, Peel's capacity to "bargain out" (Stone, 1989) and renegotiate the terms of cooperation so that the strategic priorities of other local, regional and national groups become increasingly aligned to their corporate interests serves to draw particular attention to ideas of power in the practice of economic development. On this, it is particularly interesting to consider the view of Susan Williams, Executive Director of Atlantic Gateway:
"We don't have power as such because we are not a bureaucratic organ. But we do have the ability to change the whole of the North West -our power lies in investment, the way we get people working together, the power in getting things done." (quoted in Morgan, 2012: 6) Atlantic Gateway and other private-sector led initiatives of this type may not have pure power but they do have the "power to" (Stone, 1989) influence, align and shape the future direction of economic development, particularly at the local and regional level. Democratic institutions do still retain power to decide what type of place-based economic development is legitimated and for whose benefit, but the question this article raises is for how long this can be sustained when private investment is becoming the only way economic development and regeneration can take place and local accountability structures are being undermined by austerity and longstanding failures to successfully devolve political power in England.
The second and related point appertains to the status of place-based economic development strategies in England -specifically LEPs. In their recent edited collection,
Where next for Local Enterprise Partnerships? Ward and Hardy (2013: 9) are led to conclude that "we need LEPs with larger areas, proper funding for running costs, experienced staff, and access to capital". Perhaps in looking at Atlantic Gateway, and other potential privatesector led initiatives of this type, it can be seen that they represent many of things a LEP should be … and in the case of Atlantic Gateway, the LEP that never was.
